Understanding Deterrence

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 The case of Extending Deterrence

The deployment of Jupiter Missiles at Turkey by the United States of America to exert pressure over the Soviet Union and the retaliatory action by the Soviets to deploy nuclear missiles at Cuba initiated what is now called ‘Extended Deterrence’ but that was in the most crude of forms is compared to present day definition of the same strategy. This concept developed at a rapid pace and was centralized around the policy of ‘collective defense and mutual assistance’ where alliances were formed for the same reason to exert the same both at conventional and nuclear level.

Paul K. Huth defines extended deterrence in the following words:

“A confrontation in which the policymakers of one state (‘defender’) threaten the use of force against another state (‘potential attacker’) in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally – or territory controlled by an ally (‘protégé’) – of the defender”


[2] Deterrence Now, Patrick M. Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 2003

[3] Ibid

[4] ibid

[5] ibid

[6] Kaufmann (1954)

[7] Kaufmann (1954)

[8] Kaufmann (1954)

[9] Deterrence Now, Patrick M. Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 11

[10] Deterrence Now, Patrick M. Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 11

[11] Deterrence Now, Patrick M. Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 11

[12] Deterrence Now, Patrick M. Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 2003 page 11

[13] RICHARD NED LEBOW is professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis; Nuclear Crisis Management, and with Janice Gross Stein We All Lost the Cold War

[14] JANICE GROSS STEIN is the Harrowston Professor of  Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of  Toronto. She is the author of  Getting to the Table: Processes of International Prenegotiation

[15] Deterrence and the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 2, (Summer, 1995), pp. 157-181

[16] ibid

[17] ibid

[18] ibid

[19] Deterrence and the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 2, (Summer, 1995), pp. 157-181

[20] ibid

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is a Masters in Strategic and Nuclear Studies from the National Defense University. He can be reached on m.sharrehqazi@hotmail.com

Discussion1 Comment

  1. The equation of deterrence should include the level of national morale.Though we have a credible nuclear arsenal and well equipped armed forces but we are constantly being hit by bomb attacks in KPK and Balochistan thus lowering our national morale. So even with this much military strength but with lower morale and trodden social fibre can we maintain credible deterrence?

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