In response to these tests, there was a lot of cry and hue in India, but the Indian response is not based on facts. Their military strategists, newspapers and scholars reacted very angrily. While on the other hand, any development in the Indian nuclear and conventional arsenal, though seen vigilantly by Pakistan, still the Pakistani strategists do not make noise on any such development; however, they do make it clear to the world powers that Pakistan does not want any arms race. Again, it is essential for them to make it clear that to retain the strategic balance in the region, Pakistan will have to take any step needed to safeguard this balance.
India has long been talking of their Cold Start doctrine and of surgical strikes; India, through this strategy, endeavors to fight a limited war in the nuclear overhang.
Pakistan’s successful test of tactical missiles has buried India’s Cold Start doctrine. The strategic balance was regained. After this, the Indian scholars have opened a new debate on TNWs; they see that Pakistan, after acquiring TNWs, is a threat to the world peace, and that these weapons can be easily available on the shops for the terrorists. After watching many shows, debates and research papers from India, I noticed that there was no historical account by India about how the TNW got birth. They just keep on saying that Pakistan’s TNW capability is an opening of a new chapter.
John P. Rose, in his book The Evolution of US Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 says, “During the Cold War, nuclear strategists employed varied definitions of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons were sometimes defined in relation to their intended use and zone of employment; their yield, range, or designated target; the type of delivery vehicle; or the level of command associated with the weapon in question. A particular weapon might be considered tactical by the United States and strategic by the Soviet Union, or vice versa, depending on its location, range, and intended target. Some writers during the Cold War described tactical nuclear weapons as low-yield weapons that were not meant to cause widespread physical destruction. Instead, they were to be used discriminately against a variety of military targets on the battlefield, including enemy tanks and mechanized infantry, while generating as little collateral damage as possible.”
The tactical nuclear weapons were first developed by the US to offset the Soviet conventional superiority. The other factor which is considered for the development of tactical nuclear weapons was to save money, because after employing these missiles, there is no need for a huge standing army on that particular battlefield; this concept was observed in the Eisenhower administration’s downsizing of army.
A. J. Bacevich, in his book The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam, says that tactical nuclear weapons are the “logical culmination of the longstanding historical trend toward fielding more efficient sources of firepower.”